(1) Introduction
The 2012 Trade Policy Review for Cambodia (WTO, 2012 ) is the first detailed study of this country's trade and commercial policy. Cambodia became a member of the WTO in October 2004, and was the first least developed country to join through the full accession process.
The report draws attention to the key features of the country's development policy regimes and outcomes, since it rejoined the international community two decades ago following one of the worst cases of genocide in the second half of the twentieth century. These features have been shaped by the weak institutions and absence of trust that followed three decades of devastation as a result of civil and regional wars. The country was increasingly engulfed in the Vietnam War from the mid 1960s, followed by the barbaric Khmer Rouge (KR) rule and its 'ground zero' economic policies, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of 1979, and subsequently its international isolation. Yet since Cambodia's peace settlement in 1991, and its first general elections in 1993, it has been one of the world's fastest growing economies, built on the pillars of sound macroeconomic policies, openness to trade and investment, large capital inflows, and a dynamic neighbourhood.
The TPR examines one major element of the evolving policy regime, namely trade and commercial policy. The report highlights both the deliberately open economic policies after the years of isolation, and some of the challenges of this openness, all in the context of the country's unusual policy settings, its weak institutions, its porous international boundaries, and the paucity of statistics. Our analytical review of the report is organized as follows.
Section 2 examines the country's development context, particularly the legacies of severe conflict, and its geography, as a very small economy surrounded by much larger economies.
In section 3 we summarize the key features of the report, and draw attention to elements of a research agenda for future reports. Section 4 investigates a range of 'trade plus' issues that are not directly covered in the report but which affect commercial policies and shape the potential benefits of the country's openness. In section 5 we summarize our main arguments.
(2) The Cambodian Development Context 1
Cambodia became an independent nation state in 1953 following the end of French colonial rule. For most of the first 40 years of its independence it was conflict-ridden, initially as it was drawn into the Vietnam war, and then from 1975 when the KR forces took control of the country following the defeat of the United States and the reunification of Vietnam. The Cambodia: Rapid Growth in an Open, Post-Conflict Economy factor at work. The export-oriented garments sector dominates manufacturing, generating more than half its output and almost 80% of the country's merchandise exports. This sector owed its existence initially to preferential market access arrangements that were provided to the country during its rehabilitation phase. This dynamism was maintained owing to the country's very open trade and investment policies, and generous fiscal support for the industry. The service sectors have also grown rapidly, particularly trade, transport, communications, and personal services. Apart from the general rise in incomes, the two key drivers of this services growth have been tourism, centred on the world famous Angkor Wat temple complex, and the booming capital city, Phnom Penh. In spite of this rapid growth, economic activities remain narrowly based and externally dependent. The non-agricultural economy is dominated by tourism, garments and construction. Both tourism and garments are highly export-oriented, while much of the construction sector is financed by foreign capital. This openness is both inevitable and desirable, but it does pose particular development policy challenges to which we return in section 4. Also reflecting the country's history, Cambodia's macroeconomic policy framework is unusual. As a large aid recipient, it has been able to run very large fiscal and current account deficits that have been sustainable and non-inflationary because they have been financed by aid that is highly concessional in nature. Especially during the 1990s rehabilitation period, aid flows were equivalent to at least 5% of GDP and sometimes higher.
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The country was therefore able to run large fiscal deficits without running into serious debt problems ( Figure 2 ). Tax collection procedures are also rudimentary, resulting in a high dependence on these aid flows for the provision of government services. Moreover, the government has adopted a very liberal stance towards foreign investment, and the resultant large capital inflows, combined with the aid flows, financed very large current account deficits, in several years in excess of 5% of GDP. Domestic savings, that were negligible in the wake of the country's protracted conflict, began to rise quickly, but investment rose more quickly still. Thus the large current account deficits reflect the fact that much of the country's investment continues to be financed externally.
Cambodia: Rapid Growth in an Open, Post-Conflict Economy and as a result the nominal exchange rate has come to serve as the government's de facto nominal anchor for inflation. We return to this issue in section 4.
(3) Cambodian Trade and Commercial Policy
We now examine Cambodia's trade policy and external commercial relations. We draw mainly on the WTO (2012) report, supplemented by some additional contextual information that facilitates an understanding of these trade policies and patterns. Cambodia is a highly Cambodia's trade patterns reflect the interplay of regional growth dynamics and preferential access to the OECD markets, particularly the US. At the time it emerged from international isolation, its major trading partners were almost exclusively in the East Asian region (Table   2 ). In 1995, Singapore and Thailand alone accounted for more than half of its exports, which were dominated by simple wood products. This pattern changed dramatically following the normalization of relations with the US, and with the granting of preferential market access for the country's garment exporters. Thus, just five years later garments were the major export item, and the US alone accounted for almost 60% of total exports. 
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As noted above, Cambodia is heavily dependent on trade taxes, which in all forms contribute over half of the government's total tax revenue (Table 3) . The three main forms of import levies, customs duties, excise duties and VAT, account for almost all of this revenue.
The export and other trade levies are trivial, in the category of nuisance taxes that could be abolished as part of a general reform. The data also indicate that foregone customs duties are very large, and exceed the value of those actually collected. This heavy reliance on trade taxes and the large customs revenue foregone are as would be expected for a transitional, dualistic economy. Their relative importance as revenue sources is declining over time as the tax base is broadened. As we argue below, the major policy challenge is to extend the VAT as quickly as possible, so that there is equal treatment between imports and domestically produced goods and services. This will facilitate continued trade liberalization, including full implementation of the ASEAN free trade agreement, and ensure that the government's fiscal position is not jeopardized.
With regard to the country's trade policy regime, as noted the tariff is the country's main protective instrument, in that there are relatively few non-tariff barriers (NTB's). As part of its WTO accession, the number of tariff lines was reduced to four, set at zero, 7%, 15% and 35%. Over time, the rates have been compressed, and most products placed in the lower or intermediate categories. The standard deviation of rates in 2011 was a relatively modest 9.2%. However, there is some escalation in the structure according to the level of processing, with the top tariff rate of 35% applied to a range of semi-processed and consumer goods, such as processed food products, beverages and tobacco, footwear and motor vehicles (Table 4) . With relatively thin domestic value added, this probably implies and 15% (Figure 6 ), leaving just 14% of tariff lines duty free and 10% at the top rate. Thus 53% of tariff lines are either zero or subject to the minimum tariff, up from 44% in 2001.
Cambodia has bound 100% of its tariff lines, while the average applied rate of duty is estimated at 11.7%. Second, being open to commerce has meant that the country has been able to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities, particularly in the international relocation of labourintensive manufacturing for export. For example, multinational enterprises with Asian production networks have long adopted a 'China plus one' risk diversification strategy. More recently, these firms have also adopted a 'Thailand plus one' strategy, in response to the serious floods in 2011 that incapacitated that country's production and logistics networks for several months. Thailand is the major export-oriented hub for the automotive industry in Southeast Asia, and therefore several MNEs, particularly from Japan, sought to establish production facilities in neighbouring countries. Cambodia's open economy and businessfriendly environment has been a preferred destination, particularly as the government established special economic zones on the Thai-Cambodian border. These developments serve as a reminder that openness creates commercial opportunities that are difficult to predict, since they are often driven by exogenous factors that cannot be modeled, nor incorporated into the planning paradigms of those who favour more emphasis on governments pursuing selective industrial policies. Moreover, in small economies like Cambodia, a few major industrial projects can make a significant difference, both in terms of direct labour market impacts and in garnering community support for the success of the strategy, hence underpinning its durability.
Nevertheless, this openness has to be managed, to ensure that it delivers sustainable and equitable growth. Ongoing reforms will be required in Cambodia, as international donor support declines, as the country faces intensified competition from its neighbours with the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, and as living standards rise so Cambodia: Rapid Growth in an Open, Post-Conflict Economy that a new generation of job entrants seeks more productive employment opportunities.
These issues are beyond the immediate remit of TPR reports, but they are crucial in understanding the context of trade policy. In this section, we therefore draw attention to them, as a means also of illustrating the challenges associated with managing globalization in small economies with weak institutions.
Openness introduces greatly economic volatility. This was evident in the 2008-09 global economic recession, when Cambodia's growth rate declined by eight percentage points, one of the sharpest falls in the Asia-Pacific region. Demand for its two major exports, garments and tourism, declined, while the private capital flows that had been financing much of the country's construction boom evaporated. The country therefore needs to have policies that ensure macroeconomic resilience, factor market flexibility and social support to navigate through these crises. As it turned out, the effects of the recession were quite short-lived, and by 2010 the economy was growing strongly again. But recurring negative external shocks will inevitably be a feature of this small, open and potentially vulnerable economy.
It is also needs to be noted that Cambodia has achieved export competitiveness in part through extremely low wages in the formal manufacturing sector. However, wages are now beginning to rise, owing to labour activism (aided in part by international NGO support) and the very rapid growth in demand. The export industries now have two decades of operating experience in Cambodia, but most production is confined to sewing and other simple processing activities. These are still internationally footloose activities without deep production roots in the country. Significant wage increases could endanger competitiveness unless labour productivity increases and ex-factory costs are reduced. Therefore continuous investments on the supply-side are needed, in improved education and more efficient infrastructure provision. Broad-based education investments are also required to enable the poor to participate in the expanding employment opportunities, and to help ameliorate the glaring inequalities that have emerged within the urban economy, and between it and the rural economy.
In turn, institutional development needs to accelerate, to support the development of an efficient market economy and to protect the interests of the poor and marginalized.
Unsurprisingly for a country whose formal institutions were completely destroyed by conflict, and which has subsequently had only one prime minister in continuous rule for over one quarter of a century, political power is highly concentrated and patronage networks With the nominal exchange rate exogenously determined, the ability of exchange rate policy to ease adjustments to such shocks is compromised. The real exchange rate changes Cambodia: Rapid Growth in an Open, Post-Conflict Economy required to move the economy toward equilibrium following a shock will require changes to wages, which may be slow to adjust and sticky downwards. Although it is unlikely that a small, open economy like Cambodia could pursue a totally independent monetary stance without capital controls, the issue is about the degree of discretionary power available to implement counter-cyclical monetary policy that dampens the effects of external shocks.
Heavy dollarization removes almost all such discretionary power because capital inflows or outflows automatically change the money supply when a foreign currency can be used as a medium of exchange. The duration of crises are likely to be prolonged as a result, and their social costs magnified. This is not the place to debate the pros and cons of the dollarization. 4 Arguably it has supported good macroeconomic management to the extent that it has effectively removed the scope for the government to engage in deficit financing through monetary expansion. In In passing, the Cambodian trade reforms, and the government's high reliance on trade taxes as a source of revenue, especially in the 1990s, also highlight the challenge of implementing trade liberalization while building fiscal consolidation. The empirical evidence on the fiscal implications of trade liberalization is mixed, as was pointed out by Greenaway and Milner (1991) over two decades ago. In some cases trade liberalization has led to fiscal enhancement while in others it has led to fiscal depletion. It is not yet clear which conclusion applies to Cambodia. But as the country begins to graduate from ODA it is obvious that a much more vigorous tax effort will be required.
Recent developments on the revenue side include the updating of the medium term revenue mobilization policy and strategy (2013-2018), the introduction of various non-tax revenue sources and property taxes, and the strengthening and updating of the 'Asycuda' system facilitating an automated customs clearance process. While these programs and policies are steps in the right direction in improving the revenue mobilization effort, the binding constraints relate to issues of administration and governance, which continue to limit the collection of taxes. The presence of a large informal sector, consisting mainly of small and unregistered traders, further constrains the ability of the government to raise tax revenues.
The share of total government revenue in GDP has remained relatively stagnant at about 10% since 2009, suggesting that the reform momentum has slowed. Therefore, and despite good progress historically, Cambodia's revenue share makes it the second lowest among Asian low-income countries, for which the average is 17% (IMF, 2012). and science and technology (0.1%). The technical and vocational education system is also underdeveloped, in spite of the high private returns from such education.
The education catch-up and reform agenda is therefore a very large one. It will become more pressing as regional and international competition intensifies, including from other lowwage suppliers in emerging Myanmar, South Asia and elsewhere. There will need to be greater public expenditure to achieve higher quality basic education at primary and at least lower secondary levels, with a particular focus on areas of disadvantage. For higher and technical education, the main challenge will be to make markets work more effectively, In an effort to overcome these problems, the government has established special economic zones, most privately owned, that provide an integrated package of infrastructure, logistics and regulatory compliance. This second-best measure has created a 'dualistic' economic structure that effectively discriminates against small-scale, start-up and rural enterprises that do not have the requisite resources to locate in the zones, or whose location is determined by input supplies. But the zones are arguably the most effective transitional response pending broader economy-wide reform.
(5) Conclusions
The first TPR on Cambodia demonstrates that the economy is comparatively open, formal trade barriers are relatively low, and they mainly take the form of tariffs. There is no attempt to estimate effective rates of protection in the report, but these also are likely to be generally However, its experience also illustrates that a strategy of economic openness is a necessary but not sufficient pre-requisite for rapid, broad-based development. The major barriers to economic integration are now principally behind the border, including high logistics and infrastructure costs, opaque regulations, a weak legal system and high levels of corruption.
Moreover, social outcomes have lagged economic growth and economic development is narrowly based. The glaring inequalities associated with the inflows of foreign capital and skills, and the concentrated domestic political patronage networks that benefit from this inflow, threaten to undermine social cohesion and may provoke a nationalist backlash. To ensure that the openness is broadly beneficial and durable, the impressive progress to date will need to be accompanied by a higher priority for social expenditures, extending the tax base to the very wealthy, a more inclusive political system, and institutional, legal and civil service reform.
